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the above/ABOVE advantage centers on 
the argument that the UP location and 
“yes” response are coded +, whereas the 
DOWN location and “no” response are 
coded −. They discuss studies in which 
a dot is located above or below a square 
containing the word above or below. When 
participants decide whether the location of 
the dot matches the word, they are faster to 
respond “yes” to an above/ABOVE stimu-
lus than to a below/BELOW stimulus. The 
stimulus and response are aligned when 
the dot is located above the square (++) 
but not when the dot is located below the 
square (−+). Lakens (2011) proposes that 
in our ocean decision task DOWN was 
coded +, because DOWN was the default 
endpoint for ocean. However, this explana-
tion is inconsistent with Proctor and Cho’s 
(2006) argument. If the coding of UP and 
DOWN is reversed by changing the default 
endpoint, this should also be the case when 
the above decision is changed to a below 
decision. If DOWN is the default endpoint 
for ocean, it should also be the default end-
point for below.
Criticism 2: We should investigate the 
relative contribution of semantic and lin-
guistic processing rather than try to reject 
linguistic processing. In our paper we did 
not investigate conceptual versus linguis-
tic processing, nor did we reject linguistic 
processing as an explanation for meaning 
representation. Rather, we argue that polar-
ity alignment does not explain our data. 
Contrary to what Lakens seems to suggest, 
however, the polarity alignment principle is 
not a theory of how meaning is extracted 
from linguistic information. Instead, the 
polarity alignment principle explains spa-
tial congruency effects as occurring during 
response selection in a binary task. Proctor 
and Cho (2006) argue that some stimulus–
response mappings are easier because they 
are aligned, resulting in faster responses 
than the opposite mapping. Thus, polar-
ity alignment occurs as a consequence of 
using a task where both the stimulus and the 
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Many studies have shown that task perform-
ance is affected by the relation between the 
spatial location and the meaning of a target 
word. These effects have been obtained for 
object names that have typical positions 
in the physical world (Zwaan and Yaxley, 
2003; Bergen et al., 2007; Šeticˇ and Domijan, 
2007; Estes et al., 2008) and for concepts 
that are metaphorically related to spatial 
position (Richardson et al., 2003; Meier and 
Robinson, 2004; Schnall and Clore, 2004; 
Schubert, 2005; Giessner and Schubert, 
2007; Casasanto, 2009; Van Dantzig, 2009). 
Although these findings are consistent 
with a mental simulation account, at least 
some of the interactions between meaning 
and spatial location might be explained by 
polarity alignment. In our study (Pecher 
et al., 2010) we tested whether spatial con-
gruency effects are best explained by mental 
simulations or by polarity alignment.
According to the polarity alignment prin-
ciple, stimulus dimensions and response 
alternatives with binary values are coded 
as having a + (plus) polarity or − (minus) 
polarity. An UP location is coded as + and a 
DOWN location is coded as −. Furthermore, 
a “yes” response is coded as + while a “no” 
response is coded as −. Responses are faster 
when stimulus and response polarities are 
aligned (++ or −−) than when they are 
misaligned (+− or −+). In our study, we 
presented stimulus words (“helicopter,” 
“submarine”) at an UP or DOWN location 
of the display. Participants performed either 
a sky decision task or an ocean decision task. 
We found that participants were faster to 
respond to UP than to DOWN stimuli in the 
sky decision task, but that they were faster to 
respond to DOWN than to UP stimuli in the 
ocean decision task. Our findings show that 
spatial congruency effects in semantic deci-
sion tasks are best explained by meaning 
driven spatial attention rather than polarity 
alignment. In a commentary on our study, 
Lakens (2011) argues that our conclusions 
are premature. His argument consists of two 
criticisms.
Criticism 1: The results still show 
polarity alignment effects, we just changed 
the reference frame. Lakens argues that the 
polarity alignment explanation predicts 
our results. According to Lakens (2011), 
the polarity principle states that responses 
are coded relative to multiple frames of ref-
erence. As an example, he refers to a study 
by Banks et al. (1975) in which participants 
decided which of two “balloons” or “yo-
yos” was higher or lower. The stimuli were 
two small dots at the end of vertical lines 
that extended from the top or bottom of 
the display. When the stimuli were labeled 
balloons the lines started at the bottom 
edge of the display and the dots were placed 
at the top ends of the lines, resembling 
helium-filled balloons on strings. When 
the stimuli were labeled yo-yos the lines 
started at the top edge of the display and 
the dots were placed at the bottom ends 
of the lines, resembling hanging yo-yos. 
Participants were faster to pick the higher 
balloon compared to the lower one, but 
were faster to pick the lower yo-yo than 
the higher one. The most obvious explana-
tion for this effect is that the higher bal-
loon and the lower yo-yo were easier to 
spot because they were visually sticking 
out. This is in line with the finding that 
when participants were simply instructed 
to judge the length of the string (without 
any reference to “balloons” or “yo-yos”) 
responses to the longer strings were faster 
than to the shorter strings. Thus, partici-
pants were faster to select the perceptually 
more salient stimulus than the less salient 
stimulus. Therefore, these results do not 
necessarily show that spatial position is 
coded in a relative way. Moreover, Proctor 
and Cho’s (2006) extensive discussion of 
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However, this is inconsistent with prior 
explanations of polarity effects. Second, 
Lakens (2011) suggests that by dismissing 
polarity alignment as an explanation of our 
data, we reject linguistic theories of mean-
ing. We never made such claim. Instead, we 
agree with Lakens that it is important to 
investigate how linguistic processing and 
mental simulation contribute to language 
comprehension. This issue, however, was 
not the topic of our paper.
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response have binary values. The principle 
therefore has no bearing on how meaning 
is represented.
Now that Lakens had brought up the 
subject, however, we will address the ques-
tion of meaning representation by linguis-
tic or sensory–motor processing. Lakens 
(2011) suggests that meaning is extracted 
from linguistic information. There is, how-
ever, no evidence that meaning is extracted 
from linguistic information. Rather, models 
such as HAL and LSA capture meaning. A 
crucial aspect of such models is that their 
input consists of utterances by people. 
Whatever the nature of people’s represen-
tations (symbolic or grounded in sensory–
motor processing), their utterances will 
reflect at least some aspects of their mental 
representations. Thus, that co-occurrence 
models capture perceptual aspects of the 
environment merely indicates that people 
represent and talk about such knowledge, 
and leaves open the question whether those 
representations are symbolic or grounded. 
A related question, addressed by Barsalou 
and colleagues (Solomon and Barsalou, 
2004; Barsalou et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 
2008), is whether task performance is the 
result of linguistic processing or meaning-
ful simulations. These researchers do not 
assume that meaning is extracted from lin-
guistic information, but argue that in some 
circumstances linguistic information such 
as word association is enough to perform a 
task. On this account, meaning is still rep-
resented by simulations, however, the task 
might not require activation of meaning.
In sum, Lakens’ claim that our conclu-
sions are premature is based on two inac-
curate arguments. First, Lakens argues that 
coding of spatial position as + or − is  relative. 
